At the heart of the international world order is a simple yet powerful rule. No state is permitted to use force against another except in self-defence or with the explicit authorisation of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
Yet, for decades, the United States (US) has repeatedly violated this rule, often without meaningful consequences. The problem is not the absence of law, but the structural inability of the UN to enforce it against its most powerful members.
This article interrogates the legal and political architecture that has systematically disabled the United Nations from effectively responding to aggression by the United States and, by extension, other permanent members of the Security Council.
Prohibition of Aggression Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
The UN Charter is unequivocal in prohibiting the use of force in the conduct of international relations. Article 2(4) of the Charter proscribes the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Additionally, the Charter forbids member states from acting in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations’ overarching aim of achieving and sustaining international peace and security, irrespective of the form or justification advanced.
The reference to the phrase “threat or use of force” extends beyond the actual employment of armed force, such as military invasions, aerial bombardments, or other combat operations. It also encompasses coercive conduct, including the demonstration or deployment of military capabilities, the massing of forces at land or maritime borders, or the issuance of ultimatums supported by military power, where such conduct is intended to compel another State or to interfere with its sovereign prerogatives. Use of force may manifest in attempts to seize territory, alter internationally recognised boundaries, occupy foreign territory, fragment an existing State, impose or remove governments, dictate political outcomes, or otherwise exercise control over another State’s internal or external affairs.
Exception to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
The Charter recognises only two exceptions to Article 2(4). The first exemption, provided in Article 51, provides that states have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack, until the Security Council takes the steps necessary to restore peace and security.
Second exemption, under Chapter VII, is that the Security Council may, in response to an armed attack or threats of attack, impose sanctions such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations under Article 41 of the Charter.
In instances where the Security Council considers the aforementioned measures inadequate, the Council may undertake action by air, sea, or land forces, including demonstrations, blockades, and other operations, by Members of the United Nations.
Such sanctions or actions by the Security Council, per Article 27 of the Charter, must have the concurrence of all permanent members of the Security Council, namely the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and Russia, also known as the P5. In other words, if a member of the P5 does not concur or vetoes such a decision, neither a sanction nor an armed action can be taken by the Security Council.
In instances where the veto power of a member of the P5 is evoked to avoid sanctions or armed action on it or an ally, the General Assembly, under the 1950 General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) also known as the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, may convene an Emergency Special Session within 24 hours and recommend collective measures, including economic and diplomatic measures or, in extreme cases, recommend the use of armed force.
This is, however, not an authorisation for the use of arms. These recommendations are politically persuasive but legally non-binding, and enforcement still depends on voluntary action by Member States.
Outside these exceptions, unilateral military action is illegal.
US Armed Attack on Venezuela
The United States (US), on January 3, 2026, without the authorization from the United Nations, entered the airspace of Venezuela, launched an unprovoked attack on the country’s state security and subsequently captured Nicolas Maduro, essentially deposing him as President of Venezuela.
Weeks before this attack, the US had closed Venezuelan airspace, enforced a blockade on sanctioned oil tankers entering or departing Venezuela, a step designed to limit the country’s oil exports.
The development is the clearest example of a breach of all provisions under Article 2(4) in recent history. The US threatened and eventually used force to affect the territorial integrity and political independence, which was inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the UN Charter.
Admittedly, the US has genuine national security concerns about the actions and inactions of Venezuela over the past few years. However, per the dictates of international law, such concerns should have been addressed through recognised legal means, without resorting to armed attack.
Condemnation Without Enforcement: Structural Limits of UN Action
The United Nations and its affiliated bodies, in response to the US attack on Venezuela, have issued a number of statements expressing concern and condemnation. Notwithstanding these pronouncements, no binding sanctions have been imposed, nor has any collective enforcement action been authorised against the United States.
This outcome is largely attributable to the requirement for the concurrence of all P5 members on the adoption of substantive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Obviously, the US would veto any such sanction or action tabled by the Security Council.
Moreover, while the “Uniting for Peace” framework provides a procedural avenue for the General Assembly to recommend collective measures when the Security Council is unable to act, its effectiveness remains inherently limited. The General Assembly’s recommendations, though politically significant, lack binding legal force and depend entirely on the voluntary cooperation of Member States for their implementation.
The United Nations does not possess an independent enforcement capability and must rely on contributions of troops, financial resources, and logistical support from its members. In circumstances where the States whose cooperation is required are themselves implicated in, or closely aligned with, the conduct under scrutiny, the prospects for meaningful enforcement are correspondingly diminished.
This reality underscores a persistent structural tension within the international system: the divergence between the legal obligations articulated in the UN Charter and the power, strategic interest, and political feasibility constraints on their implementation.
Implication of Structural Defects in the UN Charter
The aforementioned structural limitations inherent in the current collective security architecture raise profound concerns regarding the capacity of the international system to restrain or deter future acts of aggression by other permanent members of the Security Council.
If a permanent member is able to employ armed force against another State while effectively insulating itself from collective accountability through the exercise of veto power, the normative authority of the United Nations Charter risks being progressively eroded.
The long-term implications of this trajectory are deeply concerning. Persistent inability to respond effectively to acts of aggression by powerful States risks normalising the erosion of collective security and replacing it with a return to power-based international relations. This continued weakening of multilateral constraints increases the risk of broader confrontations with potentially global consequences.
Absent meaningful reform or renewed political commitment to the Charter’s foundational principles, the international community may find itself confronting a gradual but consequential hollowing out of the United Nations’ authority.
Until the structural asymmetry within the Security Council is addressed, whether through restraint in the use of the veto, institutional reform, or strengthened alternative mechanisms, the promise of collective security envisioned by the Charter and the assurance of lasting international peace and security will remain elusive.
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that the prohibition of aggression under the United Nations Charter is neither ambiguous nor aspirational; it is a clear and foundational rule of the post-war international legal order. The Charter establishes a comprehensive framework that permits the use of force only in narrowly defined circumstances, self-defence in response to an armed attack or collective action authorised by the Security Council. Outside these exceptions, unilateral military action is unlawful, irrespective of the strategic, political, or moral justifications advanced.
The US armed attack on Venezuela, without substantial sanctions for the former, exposes a critical disjunction between the normative clarity of the Charter and the institutional realities of its enforcement. While the United Nations has articulated legal condemnation and expressed institutional concern, its capacity to translate legal norms into binding consequences has been fundamentally constrained by the structure of the Security Council, particularly the veto power of its permanent members. Where a permanent member is itself implicated, the mechanisms of collective security are rendered largely inoperative, and the promise of accountability is displaced by political stalemate.
This structural limitation carries consequences that extend well beyond any single incident or State. The repeated inability to enforce the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against the most powerful actors risks normalising selective compliance with international law.
The future credibility of the United Nations as the central guarantor of international peace and security depends on confronting this structural imbalance.
Whether through restraint in the exercise of the veto, institutional reform, strengthened accountability mechanisms, or renewed political commitment to the Charter’s core principles, meaningful steps are required to realign power with law.
Without such efforts, the gap between legal obligation and political practice will continue to widen, undermining the collective security system and leaving the international community increasingly vulnerable to unilateral action, escalation, and instability.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Akua Serwaa Ampong is a Ghanaian lawyer with over eight years of professional experience. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and a Master of Arts in Peace, Security and Intelligence Management from the University of Professional Studies, Accra. Her work lies at the intersection of law, strategy, and policy, with a particular focus on security governance, intelligence accountability, and the legal dimensions of international cooperation.
Written by
Akua Serwaa Ampong
SOUCRCE:Citinews
