“In a time of deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.” – George Orwell
Claims that the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) incurred a US$1.7 billion loss in 2025 are misleading and do not accurately reflect either the institutional structure of Ghana’s gold-purchasing programme or GoldBod’s audited financial performance.
The facts are straightforward. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) launched the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) on 17 June 2021 as a central-bank initiative to strengthen Ghana’s foreign-exchange reserves by purchasing domestically produced gold. GoldBod did not exist at the time.
GoldBod was subsequently established under Act 1140 of 2025, which received parliamentary approval on 28 March 2025, and the institution was established on 2 April 2025. It therefore cannot be historically accurate to describe the entire DGPP, which commenced in 2021, as a GoldBod programme.
The essential point is that the Bank of Ghana and GoldBod are separate legal entities operating under distinct statutory mandates. The DGPP was a Bank of Ghana programme. As the IMF reported, the programme was significantly scaled up, particularly through the Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) arrangements. The IMF identified costs arising from trading losses, off-taker discounts, service charges and assay fees, among other factors.
GoldBod subsequently became involved in the purchase of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold under the programme. By 1 April 2025, GoldBod was conducting doré gold purchases, while a government, BoG and GoldBod arrangement in July 2025 formalised the transfer of responsibility and programme costs away from the central bank.
This distinction is critical. The IMF’s reported DGPP costs cannot simply be characterised as a GoldBod loss. Indeed, the IMF’s own reporting identifies US$214 million in losses on ASM doré transactions through the end of the third quarter of 2025, comprising mostly trading losses, together with GoldBod off-taker fees. The fees paid to GoldBod were therefore only one component of the wider financial outcome; they were not equivalent to the entire loss.
More importantly, GoldBod’s audited 2025 financial statements tell a very different story. For the year ended 31 December 2025, GoldBod reported total revenue of approximately GH¢5.55 billion, total expenditure of approximately GH¢109.58 million, and an operational surplus of approximately GH¢909.71 million.
GoldBod also received GH¢4.55 billion in government seed capital. That capital injection must not be confused with operating revenue or profit. It strengthened the institution’s capital base and was accounted for separately. The audited accounts consequently show that GoldBod generated an operational surplus of approximately GH¢909.71 million in 2025, independent of the Government’s GH¢4.55 billion capital contribution.
The evidence therefore leads to three clear conclusions:
First, the Bank of Ghana and GoldBod are separate institutions with separate statutory mandates. Sammy Gyamfi, as CEO of GoldBod, cannot be held responsible for activities undertaken by the Bank of Ghana under its own DGPP.
Second, the reported DGPP losses arose from the Bank of Ghana’s gold-purchasing programme and its associated transactions and costs. They cannot legitimately be attributed wholesale to GoldBod. Consequently, Sammy Gyamfi cannot reasonably be held responsible for a Bank of Ghana programme that predated GoldBod’s establishment.
Third, GoldBod’s own audited financial statements show a substantial operational surplus of approximately GH¢909.71 million in 2025. This represents the institution’s financial performance under its management and is a result for which Sammy Gyamfi deserves recognition.
Against this evidence, attempts to portray GoldBod as having lost US$1.7 billion fundamentally distort the financial facts. It is equally mischievous and, at best, deeply dishonest to drag Sammy Gyamfi’s name into the US$1.7 billion figure as though he personally presided over, caused or incurred that loss. Such an argument ignores the fundamental distinction between institutions, programmes, transactions and accounting outcomes.
The proper debate should therefore be based on what the IMF reports and what GoldBod’s audited accounts actually show, rather than on political insinuation or the deliberate conflation of separate financial responsibilities.
The evidence is clear: GoldBod did not lose US$1.7 billion. The DGPP was launched by the Bank of Ghana in June 2021, years before GoldBod was established in April 2025. GoldBod’s audited 2025 accounts, meanwhile, record a substantial operational surplus.
To suggest otherwise is to misrepresent both the nature of the DGPP and GoldBod’s actual financial position. That said, political mischief and dishonesty are nothing new in Ghana. Nothing surprises me in Ghana these days!
By Dominic deGraft Aidoo (UK)
