An Open Letter to the Constitutional Review Committee
The recent removal of Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo has exposed the fragility of judicial independence in Ghana. Whatever one’s view of the legality of the process, the episode highlights deep constitutional gaps in how the removal of superior court judges is handled under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution.
The petitions leading to her removal included allegations of misconduct, including financial management concerns. While the specifics of these allegations remain largely confidential, the Article 146 Committee appointed to investigate the petitions found grounds of stated misbehaviour, which ultimately led to her removal. This episode underscores a critical question: how can judges be held accountable for financial management when the judiciary itself lacks true financial autonomy?
The Limits of Article 146
Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution allows the removal of a Chief Justice or other superior court judge for “stated misbehaviour or incompetence,” upon a petition to the President and the establishment of a panel to investigate the matter.
Yet the phrase “stated misbehaviour” is not defined anywhere in the Constitution. This ambiguity leaves too much to political interpretation and weakens judicial security of tenure. Without a clear standard, a judge’s fate may depend more on politics than principle.
For over three decades, successive governments—including those led by President Kufuor and President Akufo-Addo, both eminent lawyers—have recognised flaws in the 1992 Constitution but left them unaddressed. The 2010 Constitutional Review Commission identified these same gaps, yet no amendment followed.
As it stands, the President still decides whether a petition is prima facie valid and appoints the panel that investigates it. This gives the executive significant control over a process meant to safeguard judicial independence. The result is a framework that too easily lends itself to political pressure and erodes public confidence in the impartiality of the courts.
Lessons from Canada
Canada’s constitutional framework offers a useful reference point. Section 99(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that “Judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons.”
In practice, no single branch of government-not even the Prime Minister-can unilaterally remove a judge. Allegations of misconduct are first investigated by the independent Canadian Judicial Council (CJC), composed largely of senior judges. The CJC conducts inquiries, invites representations, and issues recommendations. Only if both houses of Parliament formally agree can a judge be removed.
This layered process shields the judiciary from partisan manipulation while maintaining accountability. Removal is rare, transparent, and based strictly on demonstrable misconduct rather than political displeasure.
The contrast with Ghana’s Article 146 is instructive. In Ghana, the executive initiates and shapes the process; in Canada, Parliament and the judiciary play central roles. The result is a system where judicial independence is constitutionally protected, yet legitimate complaints are addressed without fear or favour.
Financial Oversight and Judicial Accountability
The petitions leading to the former Chief Justice’s removal included allegations of financial mismanagement. While the details remain largely confidential, the episode highlights a structural flaw: Ghana’s judiciary operates under the financial shadow of the executive. Judicial budgets, disbursements, and administrative expenditures depend on the Ministry of Finance, which undermines independence and risks politicizing accountability.
By contrast, Canada’s judiciary enjoys financial autonomy under transparent oversight. The Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, an independent statutory agency, manages judicial finances, salaries, and administration. Judges regulate their financial administration while all spending is subject to professional auditing standards. Independence and accountability coexist through clear institutional mechanisms.
Ghana can adopt a similar approach by establishing an Independent Judicial Service Commission responsible for budgeting, procurement, and internal audit. Such a body would manage judicial funds transparently, reporting annually to Parliament rather than the executive. Judges would thus gain both the freedom and responsibility to regulate their finances under public scrutiny.
Without this reform, future allegations of “financial impropriety” risk being weaponized for political purposes rather than serving genuine accountability. Financial autonomy, properly structured, protects both judicial integrity and public confidence.
A Moment for Courage and Reform
The removal of Chief Justice Torkornoo is not merely a political controversy; it is a constitutional mirror. It compels us to ask whether our institutions are strong enough to protect the rule of law from the winds of political change.
The Constitutional Review Committee has a historic opportunity to design a more balanced and transparent system-one that shields judges from intimidation while holding them accountable through due process. Judicial independence is not an abstract ideal; it is the lifeblood of democracy.
As former Canadian Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin observed, “Judicial independence is the lifeblood of constitutional governance.” Ghana must ensure that this lifeblood continues to flow-untainted by politics, sustained by principle, and guided by courage.
The time for reform is now. The credibility of our courts, and the health of our democracy, depend on it.
About the Author
Seth Kwame Awuku
is a Ghanaian writer and political analyst based in Takoradi, trained in law, Political Science, and International Relations. He has experience in corporate, immigration, and refugee law, and writes extensively on governance, leadership, diplomacy, and constitutional reform.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Chronicle’s stance.
